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COMMENT ON PROFESSOR YOO, 
ADMINISTRATION OF WAR 
RICHARD H. KOHN† 
Professor John Yoo performs a valuable service by attempting to 
apply the concepts of administrative law to civil-military relations. 
“Administrative law scholarship should pay attention to the armed 
forces,” he asserts, “not just because it performs the most important 
function of the executive branch, but because it is the largest part of 
the executive branch.”1 What he does not remind readers, more 
importantly, is that control of armed force has been an issue since the 
beginning of government—because those who have the power to 
coerce also possess at least the potential to control society. 
There is also benefit in applying principle-agent theory to 
improve civilian control in the executive branch. Professor Yoo notes 
persuasively that, in dealing with the military, the president possesses 
sufficient removal authority2—a chief tool of executive control—even 
if that power is in part limited by, among other things, the military’s 
iconic status and special legitimacy in American society, factors that 
Yoo neglects. Indeed, he writes that “[r]emoval . . . may be both too 
blunt and too narrow a tool to improve civil-military relations,”3 
although Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has used it beneficially 
since 2006, whereas his predecessors foreswore it to their 
disadvantage. 
Yet in seeking “to expand the field of inquiry” in administrative 
law to “the broader issue of control of the military,”4 Professor Yoo 
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 3. Id. at 2303. 
 4. Id. at 2283. 
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commits such fundamental errors of fact and interpretation as to 
invalidate his overall analysis and vitiate his suggestions.  
Professor Yoo’s most egregious error is to write about civilian 
control of the military as though it is exclusively a function of the 
executive branch. Most damaging is the claim that “[c]ivilian control 
of the military . . . is expressed nowhere in the [U.S. Constitution] 
except in the Commander-in-Chief Clause.”5 Professor Yoo must 
mean “expressed” in the most literal and narrow (and thus 
misleading) terms because civilian control of the military pervades 
the Constitution to the point of obsession. Article I gives Congress 
the power to create or disband military forces,6 make rules for their 
governance,7 define the circumstances and procedures for mobilizing 
the state militias (and “provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining” them),8 approve appointments of officers,9 raise (and 
deny) money,10 and more.11 The federal judiciary possesses wide 
jurisdiction over the armed forces—even if judges and justices chose 
not to exercise that jurisdiction for many decades after the 
Constitution went into effect, and then to forfeit much of that 
jurisdiction during the Chief Justiceship of William Rehnquist. All 
officers of government must swear or affirm to support the 
Constitution, including its preamble to “insure domestic Tranquility” 
and “provide for the common defense.”12 The Framers understood 
that physical control of the armed forces was impossible. They wished 
no single branch to be able to control the armed forces lest that 
branch use the military to dominate the other branches and 
overthrow the Constitution itself. Divided, shared, differentiated, 
overlapping, and sometimes conflicting authority over the armed 
forces is the heart of civilian control in the U.S. Constitution, and 
civilian control in the United States has played out that way 
historically.13 In his writing on war powers elsewhere, Professor Yoo 
seems to acknowledge this.14 
 
 5. Id. at 2281. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–13. 
 7. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 8. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16. 
 9. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 10. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 11. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–16. 
 12. Id. pmbl. 
 13. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND 
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 177–80, 400–27 (1957); LOUIS SMITH, AMERICAN 
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In citing Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers as the 
most authoritative understanding of presidential war powers (and, by 
extension, civil-military relations, which nest within various war 
powers), Professor Yoo misleads both himself and his readers.15 
Hamilton’s views of executive power were extreme even in the 1780s 
and were largely opposed by contemporaries. As Richard Beeman 
notes in a thoughtful new history of the making of the Constitution, 
Hamilton’s long speech (“five to six” hours) at the constitutional 
convention, proposing extraordinary power and authority for the 
presidency, “was greeted with a deafening silence.”16 “Hamilton’s 
views strayed so far from mainstream republican principles that they 
appeared not to merit a response. In fact, no one even rose to dispute 
them” and “none of [the Framers] was prepared to create the sort of 
‘elected monarch’ envisioned by Hamilton.”17 At Hamilton’s death, 
his friend and colleague Gouverneur Morris, himself a federalist who 
supported executive primacy and worked closely with Hamilton in 
Congress in the 1780s and later, admitted privately before giving 
Hamilton’s eulogy in 1804 that Hamilton “was in principle opposed to 
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republican and attached to monarchical government, and then his 
opinions were generally known and have been long and loudly 
proclaimed.”18 As for The Federalist Papers, Professor Beeman echoes 
a common understanding among historians of the period when he 
writes that “they were, first and foremost, political propaganda aimed 
at persuading undecided voters to support the Constitution.”19 
Professor Yoo begins by noting “the success of the military in 
gaining significant policy independence from the political leadership,” 
but then he claims that “this is no different than the account of a 
federal agency managing to prevail in pursuing its own preferences at 
the expense of the president or Congress.”20 The military, however, is 
very different from other governmental agencies, not just in its size or 
function, but in its very institutional essence. Unlike other 
organizations, the military functions under a separate legal system; 
training is physical, harsh, demanding, and identity-stripping; its 
members accept the risk of death as a condition of performing their 
duty; they have obligations around the clock; they operate under far 
more unyielding and more rigid discipline than police or other 
security forces; the government can compel service and thus at times 
some members (and sometimes an overwhelming majority) serve 
unwillingly; the hierarchy is pyramidal, rigid, and authoritarian—
more so than any other institution in society save perhaps criminal 
gangs; and, most importantly, its members and both the government 
and the American people understand and accept its unique status and 
fundamental differentiation from the rest of society. The system of 
control is sui generis, even beyond the Constitution’s special 
provisions for control and subordination; analogies to civilian 
agencies and their protocols of administrative control or 
subordination just do not fit. Thus, the statement that, “[i]f elected 
 
 18. Entry for July 13, 1804, in 2 THE DIARY AND LETTERS OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, 
MINISTER OF THE UNITED STATES TO FRANCE; MEMBER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 456, 456 (Anne Cary Morris ed., Charles Scribner’s Sons 1888). For excellent 
short sketches of Hamilton, free of the advocacy of biography, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC 
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 92–114 (1993); JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN 
POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS 32–33 (1993). 
 19. BEEMAN, supra note 16, at 407. Professor Beeman points out that the Supreme Court 
cited The Federalist Papers only once between 1790 and 1800, only fifty-eight times in the 
nineteenth century, and thirty-eight times in the first half of the twentieth century, but “in the 
last half of that century they were cited no fewer than 194 times,” suggesting that these “hurried, 
even frenzied political arguments” were used for judicial argument rather than as authoritative 
analysis of the intent and understanding of the Constitution when it was written. Id. 
 20. Yoo, supra note 1, at 2284. 
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leaders have trouble with the military, where their constitutional 
powers should be at their height, then their problems will be doubled 
with the civilian agencies”21 rests on flawed assumptions. 
Furthermore, there is often a difference between constitutional power 
and political reality. Since the early 1980s, the military has possessed 
enormous prestige across American society, whereas other federal 
agencies have much more limited reputations and constituencies—
and thus clout—both in Congress and amongst the public. 
Professor Yoo errs again when he claims that “after General 
MacArthur’s firing, civilian-military relations continued without 
many problems.” What he writes of as “strains” were often real 
conflicts or subtle evasion, and on occasion open warfare.22 
He cites only Michael C. Desch’s work to support the statement 
that “leading scholars [note the plural] have observed that civilian 
control over the military did not suffer significant disruptions under 
the pressures of the Cold War.”23 What Professor Yoo means by 
“significant disruptions” is unhelpfully imprecise. My own work, and 
that of Peter Feaver, Andrew Bacevich, Eliot Cohen, and others—
including Dale R. Herspring, whom Professor Yoo cites in the very 
next footnote—demonstrate that civilian control was often highly 
contested during the Cold War.24 Conflict occurred regularly 
throughout the period, and civilian officials, including President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, struggled not always successfully (despite 
 
 21. Id. at 2295. 
 22. Id. at 2305. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY 167–97 (2002); ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW 
AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY WAR 34–68 (2005); ELIOT A. 
COHEN, SUPREME COMMAND: SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND LEADERSHIP IN WARTIME 173–
207 (2002); PETER FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 180–282 (2003); DALE R. HERSPRING, THE PENTAGON AND THE PRESIDENCY: 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS FROM FDR TO GEORGE W. BUSH 409–30 (2005); Andrew J. 
Bacevich, Elusive Bargain: The Pattern of U.S. Civil-Military Relations Since World War II, in 
THE LONG WAR: A NEW HISTORY OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR 
II 207, 207–64 (Andrew J. Bacevich ed., 2007); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The 
Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 367–86 (1994); 
Richard H. Kohn, Building Trust: Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National Security, in 
AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: REALITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE NEW ERA 
(Suzanne Nielsen & Don Snider eds., forthcoming 2009); Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of 
Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 2002, 
at 8, 22–37; Richard H. Kohn, Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, NAT’L INT., 
Spring 1994, at 3, 3–17. 
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Professor Desch’s examples) to assert their policy preferences.25 In 
June 2007, at a conference at West Point celebrating the fiftieth 
anniversary of Samuel Huntington’s seminal book, The Soldier and 
the State, I asked a scholar of civil-military relations and the 
secretaries of defense whether any secretary of defense had 
embarked on the office fully trusting the military.26 The answer was 
no.27 All that Desch’s work demonstrates is that, until the 1990s, the 
civilians largely won these conflicts;28 it does not explore regular 
conflict over budgets, policy, and decisions in which the political and 
bureaucratic strength of the military limited civilian choices and 
behaviors. 
Thus “poor relations” did not begin “with the election of Bill 
Clinton,” as Professor Yoo states, but long before, although under 
Clinton the relationship did deteroriate dramatically, as did civilian 
control.29 
Finally, Professor Yoo argues that uniformed judge advocates 
violated civilian control by opposing George W. Bush’s 
administration on the detention of terrorist suspects and military 
commissions,30 an argument he also made in 2007.31 What voids this 
line of thinking is the role of Congress in civilian control and the 
ethical obligation of both military and legal professionals to tell the 
truth when testifying before Congress and when representing their 
clients in court, even if that means a uniformed officer must challenge 
the legal rulings of the executive branch. Uniformed lawyers act in a 
dual capacity: as military officers and lawyers. They cannot ignore or 
circumvent the ethics of either profession when acting in an official 
capacity, whether testifying on Capitol Hill or representing a client in 
a courtroom. This would violate civilian control of the military only if 
one understood civilian control as exclusively within the purview of 
 
 25. See, e.g., Andrew J. Bacevich, Generals Versus the President: Eisenhower and the Army, 
1953-55, in SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: CASE STUDIES IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT 83, 83–99 (Volker C. Franke ed., 2002). 
 26. Stevenson also authored a historical study of civil-military conflict. CHARLES A. 
STEVENSON, SECDEF: THE NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE JOB OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE passim 
(2006) (discussing the tenures of several secretaries of defense from Robert McNamara to 
Donald Rumsfeld, and the difficulties faced by every occupant of that office). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. DESCH, CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 22–38 (1999). 
 29. Yoo, supra note 1, at 2285. 
 30. Id. at 2290. 
 31. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational 
Choice Approach to the War on Terrorism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1831–45 (2007). 
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the executive branch. Because Congress and the federal judiciary also 
exercise authority over the military, officers (and not just military 
lawyers) complying with civilian control are merely navigating the 
complexities and ambiguities of civilian control as it exists in the 
United States historically and today.32 
Contrary to Professor Yoo’s assumption (“all of this has led 
historians and political scientists to warn of a crisis in civil-military 
relations”), no scholars other than Professor Yoo himself have cited 
uniformed lawyers’ opposition, in congressional testimony or court 
arguments, to Bush administration legal rulings and arguments, as 
evasion by the military of civilian control.33 
In the end, because of these errors of assumption, fact, and 
interpretation, Professor Yoo has failed to make administrative law 
add to our understanding of civil-military relations in general and 
civilian control of the military in particular.  His contribution is to 
raise the possibility, and perhaps future scholarship will contribute.  
But until then, we are left to rely on history, political science, 
sociology, anthropology, other subdisciplines of law, psychology, 
business, and journalism, all of which in recent years have deepened 
our understanding of how civilian control should operate, and how 
difficult it is in practice, both in the past and in the United States 
today. 
 
 32. This point is made clearly in as classic a text as Huntington’s, HUNTINGTON, supra note 
13, at 7–18, 163–92, and in as recent a memoir as that of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Richard B. Myers, RICHARD B. MYERS, EYES ON THE HORIZON: SERVING ON THE FRONT 
LINES OF NATIONAL SECURITY 7, 270–71 (2009); see also SARAH SEWALL & JOHN P. WHITE, 
PARAMETERS OF PARTNERSHIP: U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 22–
23, 42–45 (2009). 
 33. Yoo, supra note 1, at 2291. 
